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CHAPTER 23 
Administra tion of Justice 
ALAN J. DIMOND 
The year 1956 saw major developments in the administration of 
justice. The district courts were reorganized; multiple and resolute 
attacks were made on the congestion in the Superior Court; the Pro-
bate Courts adopted uniform forms and were knit more closely to-
gether in their administrative practices; pensions of future judges were 
conditioned on prompt retirement after pension rights accrue; and, 
above all, the Supreme Judicial Court, for the first time, was clearly 
entrusted with general supervision of the internal administration of 
all the courts of the Commonwealth, and was provided with an ex-
ecutive secretary to assist it in the performance of this work. 
The impetus for many of the changes was the report in early 
February, 1956, of the Judicial Survey Commission, a twenty-seven 
member group of private citizens appointed by Governor Herter in 
January, 1955, in response to a request of the Massachusetts Bar Asso-
ciation, to make "a study of the administration of justice in all of 
the courts of the Commonwealth." The Honorable Louis S. Cox, a 
former justice of both the Supreme Judicial Court and Superior 
Court, was the chairman. Of the other members, thirteen were lay-
men, being newspaper editors and publishers, labor leaders, business 
executives and members of the clergy_ The rest were lawyers.! 
Lay participation in law reform is not new.2 In the past it has 
often played a major role in bringing about important legal changes, 
especially in judicial organization, procedure, and administration. 
ALAN J. DIMOND is associated with the firm of Widett and Kruger, Boston. He is 
Chairman of the Legislation Committee of the Boston Bar Association, and was 
Secretary to the Judicial Survey Commission which recommended the legislation 
examined in this chapter. 
1 The Commission's Report was printed as House No. 2620. The names of the 
members of the Commission are printed in 41 Mass. L.Q., No. I, p. xvi (Mar. 1956). 
The Commission's report is also printed therein. Twenty-four of the twenty-seven 
members participated in the Commission's deliberations and signed its report. For 
the action of the Massachusetts Bar Association in requesting the creation of the 
Commission, see the Record of the 43rd Annual Meeting, June 26, 1954, 39 Mass. 
L.Q., No.3, pp. 6, 7 (1954). 
2 On the leadership of laymen in England in this field in the nineteenth century, 
see Sunderland, The English Struggle for Procedural Reform, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 725 
(1926). For recent developments in the United States, see American Bar Association, 
Section of Judicial Administration Handbook, "Cooperation with Laymen in Im-
proving the Administration of Justice" (1952). 
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Failure of laymen to take a larger part in the amendment of the law 
may perhaps be due to an attitude that the sole function of non-lawyers 
in a legal system is to serve as jurors, witnesses, and parties, but 
that any correction of the law should be left to the steady hands of the 
bench and bar. The informed layman, however, has much to con-
tribute. Viewing the law through the broad and uncommitted lens of 
the non-specialist, he can often see flaws, especially in general struc-
ture, that the lawyer, with his focus confined to the immediate partic-
cular tasks of daily practice, does not always perceive. And when 
the lawyer and the informed layman work together in a common 
dedication to the public good, they can fuse professional judgment 
and lay common sense into a product which the bench, bar, and the 
public can all understand and to which they may all respond. This 
was certainly true of the report of the Judicial Survey Commission. 
The Commission's report was comprehensive, detailed, and candid, 
covering all the courts of the Commonwealth. Particular attention 
was paid to their administrative practices since courts, if they are to be 
the ultimate guarantees of freedom and justice, must not only be im-
partial and independent; they must be efficient as well. 
The Commission observed that the Supreme Judicial Court was 
"maintaining the high traditions of its past"; the Probate Courts had 
an "enviable reputation throughout the country for their organiza-
tion and substantive law"; and the Land Court was "fulfilling satis-
factorily its function in the specialized field of registered real estate 
titles." Congestion-breaking measures recently adopted by the justices 
of the Superior Court were warmly endorsed. 
But the Commission also found defects, many of them serious, in the 
organization of the courts and in their administration. Recommenda-
tions for the correction of these defects were presented, some calling 
for action by the legislature, while others called for action or con-
tinued action by the courts. These various recommendations, and 
their outcome in 1956, make up the main subject matter of this 
chapter. 
A. THE BUSINESS OF THE COURTS 
§23.1. The Superior Court. Continuing the statistical tables con-
tained in the previous volumes of the ANNUAL SURVEY, the following 
figures, mostly gathered by the Judicial Council, indicate significant 
aspects of court business for the year ending June 30, 1956, as against 
like aspects in the years immediately preceding. Table I includes a ....... 
new set of figures reflecting the effect of the introduction of the non-
triable law docket in the Superior Court on April 1, 1956, discussed 
more fully at a later point in this chapter, whereby inactive cases are 
transferred to a suspense account some time before being written off 
as "disposed of" under Superior Court Rule 85. 
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TABLE I 
Superior Court Business 
Year 1951·52 1952·53 1953·54 1954·55 1955·56 
Undisposed of cases 
beginning of year 56,318 59,837 59,504 66,381 66,483 
Entries during year 31,587 33,060 33,946 32,366 31,586 
Dispositions during 
year 27,990 34,045 29,015 30,611 32,923 
Undisposed of cases 
end of year 60,043 50,445 64,027 67,416 67,529 
Undisposed of law 
cases end of year 61,105 
Remaining triable 
law docket end of 
year 48,702 
The obvious internal discrepancy in the 1955-1956 figures is the 
increase of the number of undisposed cases at the end of the year 
over the number of such cases at the beginning of the year notwith-
standing the excess of entries over dispositions. Professor Richard H. 
Field has called attention to similar discrepancies before.1 It is, how-
ever, significant to note that this year for the first time during the last 
ten years (except 1953 when there were general calls of the lists in 
Suffolk and Middlesex counties) the Superior Court disposed of more 
cases than were en tered. 
TABLE II 
Average Number of Months' Waiting Period 
for Jury Trials 
1954·55 1955·56 
Worcester 48 41 
Middlesex 38 36 
Suffolk 28 30 
Hampden 27 27 
Norfolk 21 26 
Essex 
Salem 27 25 
Lawrence 30 26 
Newburyport 4 5 
Berkshire 31 25 
Franklin 15 14 
About all that can be said for these figures is that as the result 
of the reduction of the waiting time in Worcester, that county has 
§2!U. 1 1954 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §27.1. 
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yielded to the Supreme Court of Queens County, New York, the 
doubtful distinction of being the most congested state court in the 
country. But Worcester was, nevertheless, the third most congested 
state court. Suffolk was the seventh and Hampden was the eleventh.2 
TABLE III 
Number of Days That Superior Court Judges Sat 
1953-54 1954·55 1955-56 
Civil jury 2806 2894i 2975i 
Non-jury 1573 1452i 1406 
Criminal 1120 1272i 1099i 
5499 5619-1 5481 
District Court Judges 
in Superior Court 
(all criminal cases) 413 498 558 
The average number of days that Superior Court justices sat was 
171 or 34 five-day weeks, against 175Y2 or 35 five-day weeks in 1954-
1955. Such averages must, of course, be considered with discrimination 
taking into account illnesses of particular justices and periods when 
a vacancy in the office of a justice may remain vacant pending the 
making of a new appointment. 
§23.2. The District Courts and the Municipal Court of the City 
of Boston. 
TABLE IV 
District Court Business 
Civil writs entered 
Removals to Superior Court 
Motor tort removals 
Criminal cases begun 
Small claims 
1953·54 
57,102 
3,998 
2,599 
202,334 
73,182 
1954-55 
63,798 
9,248 
7,756 
202,126 
70,877 
1955-56 
73,868 
13,569 
1l,965 
201,730 
68,153 
The indicated increase in the number of civil writs entered in 1955-
1956 as well as in removals may be attributed to the first full year's 
operation of the Fielding Act requiring all motor tort cases to be 
entered in a District Court. 
The figures of the District Courts, including the Boston Municipal 
Court, also show the effect of the Fielding Act. There were 35,845 
motor tort actions entered in these courts, and 16,809 were removed 
to the Superior Court, leaving 19,036 or 53 percent remaining. This 
percentage compares favorably with a figure of 57 percent as the 
2 Institute of Judicial Administration, State Trial Courts of General Jurisdiction, 
Calendar Status Study (1956). 
.t 
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average remaining during the 1938-1942 period of the earlier Fielding 
Act and may be contrasted with 46 percent as the average remaining 
after repeal during the 1947-1951 period, 46 percent for 1952, and 47 
percent for 1953, all prior to the re-enactment of the Fielding Act in 
1954. 
TABLE V 
The Ratio of Trials to Entries III 
the District Courts 
Summary process 
Motor vehicle tort 
cases not removed 
Other torts 
Contract 
Other 
1954-55 
44% 
18% 
15% 
7% 
17% 
1955-56 
38% 
14% 
15% 
6% 
18% 
The over-all percentage in 1954-1955 was 16 percent. In 1955-1956 
it was 13Y2 percent. In the Superior Court for 1955-1956 the ratio 
of trials to entries was 10 percent. The District Court decline in 
trials of summary process actions was probably due to the expiration 
on April 30, 1955, of rent control legislation together with its litiga-
tion-creating limitations on the right to evict. 
§23.3. The full-bench business of the Supreme Judicial Court. 
During the 1956 SURVEY year the full bench of the Supreme Judicial 
Court decided 248 cases, of which 152 (or 61.3 percent) were affirmed 
with an opinion, 26 (or 10.5 percent) were affirmed without an opinion, 
and 70 (or 28.2 percent) were reversed. The justices of the Supreme 
Judicial Court also rendered five advisory opinions. 
B. THE JUDICIAL SURVEY REFORMS 
§23.4. Introduction. The most important development in the 
administration of justice in 1956 was the enactment of Chapter 707 
of the Acts of 1956. This statute, the foremost recommendation of 
the Judicial Survey Commission and enacted substantially as pro-
posed, clearly entrusts the Supreme Judicial Court, for the first time, 
with general supervision of the administration of all the lower courts, 
and provides the justices of the high court with an executive secretary 
to assist them in their performance of this function. To place the 
new statute in perspective, the main features of the administration of 
the Massachusetts judicial system are outlined below. 
§23.5. Background in the Superior Court. Administrative responsi-
bility in the Superior Court is divided among the chief justice, the 
collective membership of the court as a whole, and the individual 
justices. It is not always easy to tell just where responsibility for a 
5
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particular function is lodged, for the statutes do not always speak 
with consistency or precision.1 
When a responsibility is to be conferred on the chief justice, a 
statute must say SO.2 And certain statutes do. Since 1910 a statute 
has given the chief justice authority to assign associate justices to 
particular sittings and sessions.3 Prior to that date the power of 
assignment was vested in all the justices who were permitted to work 
out the problem among themselves.4 The chief justice also has au-
thority to establish special sittings and sessions, in addition to those 
prescribed by statute, and to "designate the class or classes of business 
for which any sitting or session is established," a function conferred on 
the chief justice by temporary legislation in 1927 5 and 1928,6 and by 
permanent legislation in 1932.7 Authority to call up District Court 
justices to sit on misdemeanor and motor tort cases in the Superior 
Court and to establish sittings at which such cases shall be heard is 
another responsibility of the chief justice.S To assist him in the per-
formance of his various administrative duties, he has been provided 
with an executive clerk since 1924.9 
Where the applicable statutes do not specifically entrust an adminis-
trative function to the chief justice, they may confer it upon the justices 
of the court as a whole.10 During 1956 collective action by the justices 
in discharge of their common responsibility resulted in the re-establish-
ment of the 1935-1942 motor tort auditor system, the reinvigoration of 
the pretrial conference, the creation of the non-triable law docket, and 
§23.5. 1 Catheron v. County of Suffolk, 227 Mass. 598, 116 N.E. 885 (1917), draws 
a distinction between statutes referring to the "justices" of a court and statutes 
speaking only of a "court." In the latter case any judge holding a commission as 
a member of the court is deemed to be vested with the authority conferred on the 
court whereas in the former case the collective body of all the justices of the court is 
regarded as the repository of the authority. See also Commonwealth v. Cedzium, 
261 Mass. 299, 159 N.E. 51 (1927). 
2 The responsibilities of a chief justice of any court are to some extent the result 
of customs and traditions within the court. But it is believed that in the Superior 
Court such customs and traditions do not add significantly to the prerogatives of its 
chief justice. 
3 C.L., c. 212, §2, enacted by Acts of 1910, c. 555, §I. 
4 Revised Laws (1902), c. 157, §2. The change in 1910 was the result of a recom-
mendation appearing on page 18 of the report of the Commission to Investigate the 
Causes of Delay in the Administration of Justice in Civil Actions. 
II Acts of 1927, c. 306. 
6 Acts of 1928, c. 228. 
'1 Acts of 1932, c. 144, §7, now C.L., c. 212, §14A. Since 1897 the chief justice has 
had the authority to establish special criminal sittings and sessions. Acts of 1897, 
c. 490, §5. 
8 C.L., c. 212, §§14B and 14C, as amended. 
9 Acts of 1924, c. 188, now C.L., c. 212, §28. 
10 See C.L., c. 221, §§6, 6A, and 6B relating to the appointment of certain assist-
ant clerks. Compare C.L., c. 213, §3, referring to the authority of the "courts" to 
make "uniform codes of rules, consistent with law, for regulating the practice and 
conducting the business of the courts in cases not expressly provided for by law for 
the following purposes: ... Third, conducting trials ... Eighth, expediting the 
decision of causes and securing the speedy trial thereof ... Ninth, remedying 
abuses and imperfections in practice and diminishing costs." 
6
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the adoption of a rule imposing stricter limitations on continuances, 
all of which are discussed below. 
Yet not all the important administrative responsibilities are confided 
to the chief justice or to the associate justices as a group. The in-
dividual justice is charged with the basic responsibility of deciding 
his cases promptly. But no one on the Superior Court can tell him 
when to hand down a decision even though an inordinate amount of 
time may have elapsed since the trial. General Laws, c. 220, §14A, 
which states that a justice holding a case for more than four months 
must get an extension of time from the chief justice if he desires to 
hold it longer, is merely an exhortation without sanctions and of 
doubtful efficacy.H 
§23.6. Background in the Probate Courts and the Land Court. 
Unlike the Superior Court, which is a single tribunal, the Probate 
Courts are separate county courts functioning independently of each 
other without general uniformity in their methods of operation. Even 
within a single Probate Court having more than one judge, the several 
judges have been known to have no common administrative procedure 
since the "first judge" of such a Probate Court has no clearly defined 
authority over the administration of the court. Much the same is 
true of the Land Court. I 
As the result of the diversity of forms and practices among the 
Probate Courts, the legislature in 1931, upon the recommendation of 
the Judicial Council, created the Administrative Committee of the 
Probate Courts, an advisory body of three probate judges to be ap-
pointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court, "to rec-
ommend uniform practice and procedure." 2 
Experience showed, however, that a mere advisory status for the 
Administrative Committee was not sufficient. The various Probate 
Courts were continuing to go their separate ways much as they always 
did. The Judicial Survey Commission therefore recommended, as 
one of its principal proposals, that the Administrative Committee 
should be strengthened: first, by giving it the power to require and 
prescribe uniform forms, practices, procedures, and records; and second, 
by giving it the power of general superintendence over the Probate 
Courts, with authority to regulate assignments of judges, and sittings 
and sessions. The first of these proposals was enacted by the legisla-
11 Kerr v. Palmieri, 325 Mass. 554, 558, 91 N.E.2d 754, 757 (1950). Acts of 1935, 
c. 206, §14A also applies to the District Courts including the Boston Municipal 
Court. Permission to hold a case for more than four months must come from an 
appropriate justice of those courts. The Administrative Committee of the District 
Courts through its general power of supervision has been effective in assuring 
prompt decisions in the District Courts. 
§23.6. I Twenty-third Report of the Judicial Council 47 (1947). 
2 Acts of 1931, c. 404, now C.L., c. 215, §30A. The recommendation of the Judi-
cial Council will be found at page 12 of its Sixth Report (1930). The constitution-
ality of this type of statute is well established. Commonwealth v. Leach, 246 Mass. 
464, HI N.E. 301 (1923); Ashley v. Three Justices of the Superior Court, 228 Mass. 
63, 116 N.E. 961 (1917). 
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ture during the 1956 SURVEY year. a Partly because of constitutional 
doubts stemming from Part II, Chapter 3, Article IV of the Massa-
chusetts Constitution,4 the other proposal failed to pass. Meanwhile, 
the judges of the various Probate Courts, acting under Section 30 of 
Chapter 215 of the General Laws, and aided by the advice of the 
Administrative Committee of the Probate Courts, approved 156 
uniform probate and 8 uniform divorce forms and thereby successfully 
completed an important four-year project.5 
§23.7. Background in the District Courts. The District Courts, 
like the Probate Courts, are also separate courts. And as among the 
Probate Courts, so has there also been diversity in practice among them. 
In order to create uniformity, the Judicature Commission in 1922 
proposed the creation of an Administrative Committee of the District 
Courts, to consist of three District Court justices to be appointed by 
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court, and to have authority 
"to recommend uniform practices, forms and blanks and records " 
in all District Courts other than the Boston Municipal Court.l This 
proposal was promptly accepted by the legislature.2 
In 1941 the Administrative Committee was strengthened by raising 
it from a mere advisory body to one with administrative authority.a 
Its membership was increased to five District Court justices and it was 
given "general superintendence of all the district courts, other than the 
municipal court of the city of Boston ... " In such courts the 
Administrative Committee was authorized by the 1941 amendment to 
regulate the assignment of special justices,4 to determine the number of 
simultaneous sessions, the sittings of special justices, and the times for 
holding civil and criminal business. In the event of non-compliance 
with directions of the Administrative Committee, the Supreme Judicial 
Court was authorized to "make an appropriate order." Authority to 
prescribe uniform forms except in Suffolk County was added in 1950.5 
In 1956 the duties of the Administrative Committee were enlarged 
again. As part of the act reorganizing the District Courts,6 discussed 
below, the Administrative Committee was authorized to assign full-
time justices to sit on a circuit basis in other District Courts and to 
prescribe the hours for holding civil trials except where such hours 
a Acts of 1956, c. 664. 
4 Stating that the legislature shall appoint the times and places of sittings of the 
Probate Courts, and that pending such appointments sittings shall be held "at the 
times and places which the respective judges shall direct." 
5 Approved by the justices of the Supreme Judicial Court on July 2, 1956. 
§23.7. 1 Second and Final Report of the Judicature Commission, House No. 1205, 
p. 33 (1921). 
2 Acts of 1922, c. 532, §8. 
a Acts of 1941, c. 682, now G.L., c. 218, §43A. 
4 See, however, a possible conflict with G.L., c. 218, §40, which provides that no 
special justice, other than one of the Boston Municipal Court, shall sit in a Dis-
trict Court except upon the request of the presiding justice thereof. 
5 Acts of 1950, c. 210, now G.L., c. 218, §43B. '" 
6 Acts of 1956, c. 738, discussed in §23.15 infra. \. .... 
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were otherwise fixed by law. Also, the Administrative Committee was 
authorized "from time to time to report to the governor and to the 
general court its recommendations with drafts of legislation." 
§23.8. Background in the Supreme Judicial Court. Standing at 
the head of the Massachusetts judicial system is the Supreme Judicial 
Court, the final Massachusetts examiner of proceedings in the lower 
courts. Historically, it has reviewed lower court practices only when 
an aggrieved litigant has claimed that an error has been committed. 
General continuous supervision of lower court administration has not 
been regarded as the high court's function. 
Section 3 of Chapter 211 of the General Laws, which dates back to 
1782 without significant change,l might seem to suggest a broad super-
visory responsibility for the Supreme Judicial Court. This section 
reads: 
The supreme judicial court shall have general superintendence of 
all courts of inferior jurisdiction to correct and prevent errors and 
abuses therein if no other remedy is expressly provided; and it may 
issue writs of error, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, quo 
warranto and all other writs and processes to such courts and to 
corporations and individuals which may be necessary to the 
furtherance of justice and to the regular execution of the laws. 
But as interpreted and applied, this statute has been confined to the 
issuance of extraordinary writs in particular judicial proceedings in 
which the court's jurisdiction has been formally invoked by an 
aggrieved party.2 Administrative supervision, with its requirements 
of continuity, flexibility, and informality, obviously cannot be carried 
out within these limitations. 
Other statutory provisions conferring on the Supreme Judicial Court 
a measure of administrative control over the lower courts are indirect 
in their effect or confined to a few specific subjects. A provision 
of the first type is the one which authorizes the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Judicial Court to appoint the members of the Administrative 
Committees of the Probate and District CourtS.3 Similar provisions 
are those which authorize the high court to "make an appropriate 
order" upon non-compliance with an order of the latter Committee;4 
to appoint assistant clerks in certain lower courts;5 and to remove 
clerks, registers of probate, recorders, district attorneys and sheriffs 
"if it appears that the public good so requires." 6 
§23.8. 1 See Dolan v. Commonwealth, 304 Mass. 325, 332, 23 N.E.2d 904, 909 
(1939). 
2 Commonwealth v. Cummings, 3 Cush. 212 (Mass. 1849); Peters v. Peters, 8 Cush. 
529 (Mass. 1851); Commonwealth v. Scott, 123 Mass. 418 (1877). 
3 G.L., c. 215, §30A (Probate Courts); G.L., c. 218, §43A (District Courts). 
4 G.L., c. 218, §43A. 
5 G.L., c. 221, §4. 
6 G.L., c. 211, §4. This statute is constitutional. Attorney General v. Tufts, 239 
Mass. 458, 131 N.E. 573 (1921); Attorney General v. Pelletier, 240 Mass. 264, 296, 134 
N.E. 407, 414 (1922); Attorney General v. Flynn, 331 Mass. 413, 120 N.E.2d 296 
(1954). 
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Statutes having a more direct impact are those which authorize the 
Supreme Judicial Court to "alter or amend" the rules and forms pre-
pared by the judges of the various Probate Courts under Section 30 
of Chapter 215 of the General Laws and "to make such other rules and 
forms for regulating the proceedings in the probate courts as it con-
siders necessary in order to secure regularity and uniformity";7 and to 
prescribe the manner in which papers entered in the lower courts shall 
be extended on the records, and to prescribe the method of disposal 
of obsolete records and stenographers' notes.s 
Resort to the Supreme Judicial Court's inherent power over the 
practice of law has had the most direct impact of all on the adminis-
tration of the lower courts. Without the aid of any statute, and 
solely by virtue of this inherent power, the Supreme Judicial Court 
has issued a general rule preventing justices, special justices, clerks, and 
assistant clerks of the District Courts from practicing criminal law and 
also from practicing on the civil side of their own courts.9 
§23.9. Background in the Judicial Council. Adding up these vari-
ous responsibilities and the Supreme Judicial Court's inherent control 
over the practice of law we do not find any general and continuous 
supervision of the administration of the lower courts. Until this past 
SURVEY year the only agency charged with such supervision was the 
Judicial Council created in 1924, upon the recommendation of the 
Judicature Commission, to make a "continuous study of the organiza-
tion, rules and methods of procedure and practice of the judicial 
system of the Commonwealth, the work accomplished and the results 
produced by that system and its various parts." 1 The Council is 
charged with the duty of reporting annually to the Governor and it 
"may also from time to time submit for the consideration of the 
justices of the various courts such suggestions in regard to rules of 
practice and procedure as it may deem advisable." Its membership 
consists of a judge or former judge of the Supreme Judicial Court, the 
Superior Court, the Land Court, and the Boston Municipal Court; 
one probate judge, one District Court judge and not more than four 
members of the bar. Since its creation the Judicial Council has 
sponsored much valuable legislation that has materially improved the 
practices and efficiency of the courtS.2 But the Council has been 
handicapped by being situated outside the judicial system rather than 
within it, and thus not possessed of the authority and responsibility 
necessary to obtain the maximum results from its work. 
7 G.L., c. 215. §30. 
8 G.L.. c. 221. §§27 and 27A, implemented by Supreme Judicial Court General 
Rules Nos. 7. 8, and 9 (1952). 
9 General Rule No.2 (1952). Held valid in Collins v. Godfrey, 324 Mass. 574. 87 
N.E.2d 838 (1949). 
§23.9. 1 Acts of 1924. c. 244. as amended. now G.L.. c. 221. §§34A-34C. 
2 A list of statutes adopted as the result of recommendations of the Judicial Coun-
cil will be found in the Council's Twenty-seventh Report 39 (1951). 
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§23.10. Unified supervision and the 1956 legislation. If there is 
to be fully effective supervision of the procedures and practices of 
the courts, an agency forming a part of the judicial system itself must 
be charged with the authority and responsibility for supervision. 
That there should be such an agency is the opinion of many distin-
guished authorities on judicial administration. As one of them has 
said, "Modern conditions of our urban, commercial and industrial 
civilization require that there must be some head to a state judicial 
department. Some judge or court should be charged with the efficient 
operation of the whole system." 1 
The Judicial Survey Commission and the legislature reached the 
same conclusion. As a result, Chapter 707 of the Acts of 1956 was 
passed.2 This act amends G.L., c. 211, §3 by adding a paragraph 
entrusting to the Supreme Judicial Court "general superintendence 
of the administration of all courts of inferior jurisdiction" and em-
powering it "to issue such writs, summonses and other processes 
and such orders, directions and rules as may be necessary or desirable 
for the furtherance of justice, the regular execution of the laws, the 
improvement of the administration of the courts, and the securing of 
their proper and efficient administration." 3 
The Commission and the legislature both realized that the Supreme 
Judicial Court should not be burdened with administrative tasks that 
would interfere with its primary appellate function of supervising 
the application of the substantive law. The Commission therefore 
recommended and the legislature created an administrative office of 
the courts to assist the Supreme Judicial Court in its administrative 
functions. This new office is headed by a full-time executive secretary 
appointed by the justices of the Supreme Judicial Court to hold 
office at their pleasure. Subject to the direction and supervision of 
the justices of the high court, the executive secretary has been given 
a number of functions to perform, primarily of an information-gather-
ing nature relating to administrative methods, the condition of dockets, 
physical accommodations, supplies, equipment, expenses of operating 
the courts, and the investigation of complaints. Annually he is to 
submit a report of the activities of the administrative office together 
with his recommendations, and this report shall be a public document. 
To avoid duplication of function, the act transferred the statistical 
functions of the Judicial Council to the executive secretary. 
By passing this legislation, Massachusetts has joined the "unmis-
§23.1O. 1 Vanderbilt, The Challenge of Law Reform, c. 4 (1955); Essentials of a 
Modern State Judicial System, 30 Notre Dame Law. 227 (1955). See also Phillips, 
Better Court Administration, 39 J. Am. Jud. Soc. 9 (1955). 
2 The measure was originally defeated in the House, but was ultimately passed 
after being revived by a special message from Governor Herter. 
a This authority is clearly within the constitutional powers of the Court. Case 
of Supervisors of Elections, 114 Mass. 247 (1873); Opinion of the Justices, 300 Mass. 
596, 14 N.E.2d 465, (1938); Attorney General v. Dover, 327 Mass. 601, 605, 100 
N.E.2d I, 4 (1951). 
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takable forward movement in achieving greater integration, efficiency 
and responsibility in state court systems." 4 Administrative offices of 
various types have been created in seventeen other states as well as in 
the federal courts, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.1> 
C. REORGANIZATION OF THE DISTRICT COURTS 
§23.11. Introduction. After many years of study and effort, includ-
ing a comprehensive report and an emphatic recommendation of the 
Judicial Survey Commission, a District Court reorganization act was 
finally passed in 1956, to become effective July 1, 1957.' Central 
to this act, as to all previous District Court reorganization plans, was 
the objective of putting an end, as far as practicable, to the dual and 
sometimes conflicting activities of the lawyer-judge. In recent years, 
various restrictions, some already mentioned, have been imposed on the 
scope of the private law practice in which the lawyer-judge may 
engage.2 But this approach, important as it has been, has been piece-
meal at best and has furnished no fundamental solution. The time 
had arrived for basic changes. 
One approach, direct and simple but hardly feasible, was to put 
all part-time District Court justices on a full-time basis by barring them 
completely from the practice of law and giving them a salary increase 
to compensate to some extent for their lost law practice. The obvious 
weakness of this solution was the lack of enough District Court 
business to keep all the justices busy on a full-time basis. A more 
feasible plan was to put on a full-time basis, with a salary increase, only 
the justices from the busier courts; bar all other District Court justices, 
regular or special, from hearing any civil cases other than minor contro-
versies; and, in order that all District Courts would have full-time 
justices available to hear major civil cases, require these justices to sit 
on a circuit basis in any District Court upon the order of the Adminis-
trative Committee of the District Courts. This latter plan was the one 
recommended by the Judicial Survey Commission, as well as by prior 
groups which had studied the matter, and was the one adopted by 
the legislature. 
§23.12. The reorganization plan. Specifically, the act selected 
thirty-one part-time justices and converted them into full-time justices. 
As a result, the number of full-time justices, including the nine al-
ready in the Boston Municipal Court, was increased from twenty to 
fifty-one in thirty-nine courts. Salaries were fixed at $12,000 a year 
4 The Book of the States, 1956-1957, p. 193. 
I> The other states are Colorado, Connecticut, ~daho, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Ore-
gon, Rhode Island, Virginia, and Wisconsin. See Institute of Judicial Administra-
tion, Chart of Functions Performed by Court Administrative Offices, July 18, 1956. 
§23.11. 1 Acts of 1956, c. 738. Professor Richard H. Field described recent de-
velopments in District Court reorganization in 1954 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §27.11. 
2Id. §27.12. 
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except in the Boston Municipal Court where in 1955 the salaries 
of the associate justices had been set at $15,000 and the salary of the 
chief justice at $16,000. 
The act provides that (except in the Boston Municipal Court, on the 
Islands, and on part of the Cape) no justice other than a full-time 
justice shall hear civil cases other than supplementary proceedings, 
summary process, small claims, and proceedings relating to juveniles 
and insane persons without the authorization of the Administrative 
Committee of the District Court. To assure all District Courts that 
they will have full-time justices to hear cases requiring such justices, 
the act authorizes the Administrative Committee to assign the full-
time justices, except those in the Boston Municipal Court, to sit in 
the various District Courts on a circuit basis. 
The act retains part-time justices, both regular and special, for 
criminal business and for the minor civil matters already mentioned. 
A section inserted in the act by the Joint Judiciary Committee qualifies 
the sitting of part-time justices, however, by stating that no part-
time justice shall hear a case "if he shall know that a partner or 
office associate of his has been directly or indirectly retained in the 
case." 
Contrary to various proposals, including that of the Judicial Survey 
Commission, that part-time justices (regular and special) be ultimately 
eliminated by not filling vacancies occurring in their offices, the act 
states that such vacancies shall be filled subject to the limitation that 
a vacancy in the office of a special justice shall be filled only if the 
number of special justices in the court involved will not thereby 
exceed the number of that court's full-time and part-time regular 
justices. 
§23.13. Salaries of District Court derks. The question of the sal-
aries of clerks and other administrative personnel was a matter on which 
there was considerable difference of opinion. In the past, such salaries 
have been simply a percentage of the salary of the justices. With 
the increase in the salaries of the new full-time justices to $12,000, 
the automatic continuation of the percentage method would have 
resulted in a large expense that could not be justified on the basis 
of work load, since the work of individual District Court administra-
tive personnel will continue substantially as before. The matter 
was finally settled by giving the clerks in the new full-time courts 
a flat 20 percent increase. 
§23.14. Six-man juries. As an experiment for two years beginning 
July I, 1957, the act authorizes trials with juries of six in the Central 
District Court of Worcester in all civil actions, upon the consent of 
both parties, subject to direct review by the Supreme Judicial Court. 
If one party refuses a claim made by the other party for a trial by such 
a jury, the party making the claim may remove the case to the 
Superior Court for trial with or without jury. Otherwise the case 
will stand for trial without jury in the Central District Court. 
The statute fully satisfied all constitutional requirements, there 
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being no infringement on the right of removal to the Superior Court 
for trial by jury. In fact, it is believed that the statute by affording an 
opportunity to refuse a claim for a jury of six goes beyond the mini-
mum constitutional requirements since the right of removal upon 
entry that is afforded a defendant (and the plaintiff where he must 
start his action in a District Court) is, without more, a sufficient con-
stitutional safeguard to the defendant (or to such a plaintiff) and the 
right to start an action in the Superior Court is likewise a sufficient 
protection to the plaintiff in all other cases.1 
D. REFORMS IN THE SUPERIOR COURT 
§23.15. Strengthening the pretrial conference. On December 20, 
1955, the justices of the Supreme Judicial Court issued a Notice to 
the Bar designed to reinvigorate pretrial conference practice under 
Superior Court Rule 58. Formerly an issue-shaping encounter of ac-
credited trial counsel, the pretrial conference had declined to a shape-
less meeting of uninstructed juniors. This year's Notice, patterned 
after a Notice to the Bar of the late Justice Wilford Gray on June 30, 
1935,1 establishing the first pretrial session in Massachusetts, stated 
(like the earlier one) that "litigants must be represented at the pre-
trial call by an attorney having full power to act in all matters 
pertaining to the case." Another provision in this year's Notice - not 
present in the Notice of 1935 - reminded the bar that the court at 
pretrial has the power to enter nonsuits and defaults "if the attorney 
should not have power to act in all matters pertaining to the case." 
§23.16. Reinstallation of the auditor system. In order to handle 
the engulfing numbers of motor tort cases, the justices of the Superior 
Court on March 15, 1956, re-established the 1935-1942 motor tort 
auditor system wherby all motor tort cases are referred to auditors 
for findings of fact. Although not universally acceptable to the bar, 
the results of the 1935-1942 experience demonstrate the efficacy of 
auditors in disposing of many cases in a manner satisfactory to most 
litigants. Of the 35,930 motor tort cases referred to auditors during 
the 1935-1942 period, only 1606 (1392 jury and 214 non-jury) were 
actually tried after the filing of the auditor's report, the balance having 
been disposed of by settlement, by discontinuance or nonsuit, or by 
motion for judgment on the report. 1 
By contrast, in the year ending June 30, 1955 - certainly no less 
busy than the entire 1935-1942 period - the Superior Court tried 1333 
motor tort cases of which 1175 were jury and 158 were non-jury. 
§23.17. Continuances for engagements of counsel. Continuances 
naturally prevent cases from being tried in their regular turn. Partly 
§23.l4. 1 Jones v. Robbins, 8 Gray 329 (Mass. 1857); Holmes v. Hunt, 122 Mass. 
505 (1877); H. K. Webster Co. v. Mann, 269 Mass. 381, 169 N.E. 151 (1929). 
§23.15. 1 Reprinted in the Thirty-first Report of the Judicial Council 43 (1954). 
§23.16. 1 From unpublished figures compiled by the late Edmund S. Phinney, 
executive clerk to the chief justice of the Superior Court. 
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perhaps as the result of a belief that the delay in the trial of cases was 
due to an insufficient number of trial counsel, the justices of the 
Superior Court during the 1956 SURVEY year issued a rule imposing 
a strict limitation on the granting of continuances for engagements 
of counsel in civil cases. The new rule, here given in full, provides: 
No party shall have a right to a postponement of trial because 
of engagement of counselor for the convenience of counselor 
parties, but the Court will grant a postponement if counsel is 
actually engaged before the Supreme Judicial Court and may 
grant a postponement because of engagement of counsel for not 
more than ten days or until said engagement is concluded. 
No other postponement shall be granted to the same counsel 
except for good cause arising subsequent to the granting of the 
postponement.1 
The problem of continuances for engagements of counsel is not a 
new one. In 1890 a statute, obviously designed to protect trial counsel, 
provided that an attorney actually engaged in trial before either the 
Supreme Judicial Court or the Superior Court should not be obliged 
to try any other case in those courts unless it should appear "that it is 
just and equitable that he should so proceed." 2 Engagements before 
the Land Court and auditors were similarly protected in subsequent 
years.3 But in 1912, following a 1910 survey commission conclusion 
that the effect of the statute was to reduce the number of available 
trial counsel and thereby impede the flow of judicial business, the 
statute was repealed.4 
§23.18. The non-triable docket. In order to clear law dockets of 
inactive cases before their formal dismissal under Rule 85, the justices 
of the Superior Court issued an order effective April 1, 1956, creating 
a "non-triable docket" applicable to all counties except Dukes and 
Nantucket. This order enumerates various docket-blocking events' 
upon the occurrence of which a case shall be transferred to the new 
docket. The effect of such a transfer is that "no further proceedings 
other than entry for final disposition by dismissal or agreement may 
be had therein without special order of the Court." 
Conceived originally perhaps as an inventory-taking device, the 
non-triable docket in its few months of operation is believed to be 
serving the important administrative function of enabling the judicial 
manpower of the Superior Court to be deployed where litigation con-
tinues to remain alive.2 
§ 23.17. 1 Superior Court Rule 57A. 
2 Acts of 1890, c. 451. 
3 Acts of 1900, c. 418, §2 (auditors); Acts of 1904, c. 448, §9 (Land Court). 
4 Acts of 1912, c. 542. The commission is referred to in §23.5, note 4, supra. 
§23.l8. 1 Such as a general continuance, death, or bankruptcy, followed by a 
six·month period of inaction. 
2 An additional administrative change adopted after the close of the SURVEY year 
was the establishment of a Civil Trial List Assignment Session in Suffolk County, 
effective November 5, 1956. This session appears to have been established by the 
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E. OTHER LEGISLATION CONCERNING THE COURTS 
§23.19. Judicial pension legislation. Under the Massachusetts 
Constitution of 1780 all judges in the Commonwealth "hold their 
offices during good behavior." 1 For misconduct they may be removed 
by the Governor and Council upon the address of both houses of the 
legislature,2 or by the Senate in impeachment proceedings based on 
articles prepared by the House.S Article 58 of the amendments 
adopted in 1918 authorizes the Governor and Council, after notice 
and hearing, to retire a judge involuntarily because of "advanced age 
or mental or physical disability." Age alone, the Supreme Judicial 
Court has said, is not a ground for involuntary retirement under 
Article LVIII.4 For the amendment to apply, there must be first a 
specific inability of a particular judge to perform his judicial functions. 
Any establishment of a uniform compulsory retirement age for all 
judges would therefore be an unconstitutional encroachment on a 
judge's tenure during good behavior. 
A judge may, of course, voluntarily relinquish his office. But if 
he does so, his salary stops. Partly in recognition of the financial 
hardship that might ensue, partly due perhaps to a desire to encourage 
older judges to retire, and partly no doubt out of a sense of appre-
ciation for the performance of a high public trust, the legislature 
has from time to time provided pensions for judges. 
The first judicial pension legislation was enacted in 1885 when 
pensions were provided for justices of the Supreme Judicial Court.5 
Pensions for other judges were later added until by 1911 all judges in 
the Commonwealth, except special justices of the District Courts, were 
covered by a pension program.6 All were noncontributory in nature. 
Subsequent years saw various changes. In 1918 Article LVIII of 
the amendments, already mentioned, was adopted with a clause pro-
viding that when a judge retires involuntarily, his retirement should 
"be subject to any provisions made by law as to pensions or allowances 
payable to such officers upon their voluntary retirement." 
The years 1920 and 1921 saw the practical elimination of all judicial 
pensions upon voluntary retirement. Legislation was enacted denying 
voluntary retirement pensions to all future judges, and also to those 
chief justice acting under C.L., c. 212, §14A to establish special sessions and to desig-
nate the class of business to be transacted in them. 
§23.19. 1 Mass. Const., Part II, c. 3, Art. I. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Mass. Const., Part II, c. I, §2, Art. VIII; id. §3, Art. VI. 
4 Opinion of the Justices, 271 Mass. 575, 171 N.E. 237 (1930). 
5 Acts of 1885, c. 162. 
6 Acts of 1887, c. 420 (Superior Court); Acts of 1906, c. 474, and Acts of 1910, 
c. 540, §I (Probate Courts); Acts of 1908, c. 179 (Land Court); Acts of 1911, c. 682 
(Distlict Courts); Acts of 1911, c. 231 (Boston Municipal Court). 
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existing judges who accepted certain salary increases then granted.T 
Mitigating changes were added in 1931 for the benefit of certain jus-
tices of the Supreme Judicial Court and for certain probate judges.8 
But pension coverage upon voluntary retirement of most judges con-
tinued to be nonexistent until 1937 when a simple and workable 
pension statute, like those in effect prior to 1920 and 1921, was adopted 
granting noncontributory voluntary retirement pensions at three 
fourths of salary to all judges of all courts (other than special justices 
of the District Courts), whenever appointed, who had attained the 
age of seventy and who had at least ten continuous years of judicial 
service.9 
So the law stood when the Judicial Survey Commission took up the 
subject of judicial pensions. All members of the Commission were 
impressed with the desirability of offering an inducement to older 
judges to leave the bench even though in certain cases valuable and 
indeed irreplaceable services might thereby be lost. Compulsory re-
tirement upon attaining a specified age was, as we have seen, not 
permissible. After consideration of various alternatives, the solution 
that finally recommended itself to the Commission was to condition 
the pension rights of a future judge upon his prompt resignation after 
he becomes eligible for a pension. Failure to resign at that time would 
deprive a future judge of his pension upon his voluntary retirement 
at a later date. A majority of the Commission recommended seventy 
as the age for resignation after ten years of service. A minority felt 
that the age for justices of the Supreme Judicial Court should be 
seventy-five. The legislature adopted the majority view and passed 
the bill as submitted.lO 
There seems to be little doubt about the constitutionality of the 
legislation. Recent decisions have held that governmental pensions, 
especially those of a noncontributory nature like a judicial pension, are 
gratuities which may be withdrawn at the pleasure of the legislature.l1 
It would seem to follow that a pension may be provided on such terms 
'7 Acts of 1920, c. 627, §4 (Supreme Judicial Court, Superior Court, and Land 
Court); Acts of 1920, c. 614, §I (Boston Municipal Court); Acts of 1921, c. 487, §7 
(Probate Courts); Acts of 1921, c. 413 (District Courts). Judges involuntarily retired 
under Article LVIII were still entitled to pensions. 
8 Acts of 1921, c. 426, §I42. 
9 Acts of 1937, c. 409, G.L., c. 32, §65A. Pensions for special justices of the Dis-
trict Courts were provided by Acts of 1941, c. 689. 
10 Acts of 1956, c. 670. The act applies only to judges appointed to their respec-
tive offices after July 31, 1956. Observe that a judge first appointed to the bench 
after attaining the age of sixty will be entitled to his pension rights provided that 
he resigns after completing ten years service even though he will thus be over 
seventy at the time of his resignation. To become entitled to receive a pension, 
future judges must resign within thirty days after they become eligible. 
11 Foley v. Springfield, 328 Mass. 59, 102 N.E.2d 89 (1951); Kinney v. Contributory 
Retirement Appeal Board, 330 Mass. 302, 113 N.E.2d 59 (1953); Roach v. State 
Board of Retirement, 331 Mass. 41, 116 N.E.2d 850 (1954); McCarthy v. State Board 
of Retirement, 331 Mass. 46, 116 N.E.2d 852 (1954). 
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as the legislature may see fit to impose, including the relinquishment 
of a judicial office at a specified time. 
§23.20. District Court judges sitting in the Superior Court. Chap-
ter 472 of the Acts of 1956 carried out a recommendation of both the 
Judicial Council and the Judicial Survey Commission by continuing 
until September I, 1961, with perfecting administrative amendments, 
the temporary statute providing for sittings of District Court justices, 
other than those in the Boston Municipal Court, on misdemeanor 
and motor tort cases in the Superior Court.! The new statute is being 
extensively employed, particularly in motor tort litigation. 
§23.21. Transfer to District Courts of motor tort cases erroneously 
entered in the Superior Court. Chapter 426 of the Acts of 1956 amends 
the Fielding Act by permitting transfer to the District Courts of motor 
tort cases erroneously entered in the Superior Court. This amend-
ment had been recommended by Professor Richard H. Field in the 
1955 ANNUAL SURVEy.1 
§23.22. Forms of pleadings. Chapter 313 of the Acts of 1956 
amends C.L., c. 231, §147 by permitting the various lower courts, 
rather than the Supreme Judicial Court alone as under prior law, to 
prescribe forms of pleadings subject, however, to final approval of the 
justices of the high court. This amendment had been recommended 
by the Judicial Council and the Judicial Survey Commission, partly 
in the hope that the Superior Court justices would thereby eliminate 
the use of the general deniaJ.1 
§23.23. Jury claims on removals to the Superior Court. Chapter 
302 of the Acts of 1956 eliminates the need for a claim for a trial 
by jury in order to remove a case to the Superior Court. This act 
resulted from a recommendation of the Judicial CounciJ.1 
§23.24. Defeated legislation. In a year such as that of the 1956 
SURVEY, in which so much far-reaching and important legislation was 
enacted, it may seem ungracious to point out that other important 
legislation was defeated. However, some of the defeated bills were 
of particular significance and should receive some notice in a review 
of the year's events. Three bills which failed of passage seem most 
worthy of comment. A fifteen-dollar jury fee, a recommendation of 
the Judicial Survey Commission as well as of the Judicial Council, 
was defeated. A proposal to permit the use of limited oral depositions 
of parties before trial in the Superior Court, a recommendation of 
both the Judicial Survey Commission and the Judicial Council, also 
failed to pass. A substitute measure passed by both houses proved 
§23.20. 1 The need for the amendments is pointed out in the Thirty-first Report 
of the Judicial Council 15 (1955). 
§23.21. 1 1955 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §23.5, n. 2. 
§23.22. 1 The Judicial Council recommendation will be found in its Thirtieth 
Report 14 (1954), and in its Thirty-first Report 13 (1955). 
§23.23. 1 Twenty-seventh Report 17 (1951); Twenty-eighth Report 22 (1952); 
Thirty-first Report 12 (1955). 
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to be so ambiguous and so narrow in its application that, upon re-
quest of Governor Herter, the measure was recalled and thereupon 
rejected by the Senate. Finally, a bill recommended by the Judicial 
Survey Commission for the purpose of entrusting full rule-making 
power to the Supreme Judicial Court failed to pass but was referred 
to the Judicial Council for study. 
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